The 1860's was a time of rapid Russian imperial expansion in Central Asia undertaken by an impoverished government whose main efforts were being devoted to domestic reform. These overland advances into the heart of Asia preceded by a decade or more renewed overseas expansion by Great Britain and France. I Soviet and western historians have long debated the causes of L, Russia's conquest of Central Asia.' Certainly economic factors such :
as the desire to expand Russian trade, obtain raw materials, and secure markets were important. But considerations of power and prestige appear to have played an even greater part in causing the Russian advance. Much of Central Asia constituted a power vacuum lying between the British and Russian spheres of influence; it was I virtually inevitable that one power or the other would fill the void. Central Asian geography favored Russia because there were no , important obstacles to an advance from the steppe to the north nor was there a genuine natural frontier short of the Hindu Kush range. Russian military men argued that limited expansion which would close the gap in its lines of steppe fortifications would establish a shorter, more defensible frontier, safeguard friendly tribesmen from attack, and protect the trade routes between Russia and Central Asia. And the generals and governors on the spot who employed such arguments were anxious to achieve, like their British and I French counterparts, personal advancement and glory for themselves and their country. A general picture of the Russian conquest and its results has been provided in recently published works,2 but the need for specialized studies of this era remains. For the crucial period of the mid-1860's when rapid expansion was resumed, the views of Russian statesmen and commanders can be examined in detail with the aid of extensive published documents3 and some unpublished materials.' This paper seeks to explain the motives of those responsible for Central Asian imperialism during those years and provide answers to the questions: Was there genuine debate about its desirability and extent? Did the Foreign Ministry's public opposition to major annexations there merely camouflage aggressive expansionism? Did specific advances result from carefully formulated official plans or from unauthorized adventures by local commanders? Why could St. Petersburg not control ambitious commanders?5
